The Intelligibility Problem for Libertarian Free Will

We are (at long last) embarking on The Intelligibility Problem for libertarianism. Now here's a big task for you: Consider what Kane has to say to this problem and evaluate it (as best you can). Does he have a good response to The Intelligibility Problem?

Be sure to interact with each other!

Kane, Ultimate Responsibility, and Will-Setting

We've been discussing Robert Kane's libertarianism. (As noted in class, libertarianism is the view that incompatibilism is the case (i.e., that free will and determinism are incompatible) and that we have free will.)

Here are two interesting (lengthy) passages from Kane that I'd like you to consider:

"UR thus entails both indeterminism and alternative possibilities or AP. But it entails them by different argumentative routes. Two separate regresses are involved. (I call this the "dual regress of free will.") The first regress begins with the requirement (of UR) that agents must be responsible by virtue of past voluntary actions for anything that is a sufficient cause of their actions. Stopping this regress requires that if agents are to have free will, some actions in their life histories must be undetermined (must lack sufficient causes). The second regress begins with the requirement that agents be responsible by virtue of past voluntary actions for anything that is a sufficient motive for their actions. Stopping this regress requires that some actions in an agent's life history must be will-setting (so they do not have sufficient motives already set) and hence must satisfy the plurality conditions and hence AP."

Kane continues:

"The first of these two regresses results from the requirement that we be ultimate sources of our actions, the second from the requirement that we be ultimate sources of our wills (to perform those actions). If the second requirement were not added, we might have a world in which all the will-setting was done by someone or something other than the agents themselves, as in the imagined world in which all the will-setting was done by God. Agents in such a world might be unhindered in the pursuit of their purposes or ends, but it would never be "up to them" what purposes or ends they pursued. To have free will therefore is to be the ultimate designer of one's own purposes or ends or goals. And if we are to be the ultimate designers of our own purposes or ends, there must be some actions in our life histories that are will-setting, plural voluntary [i.e., could have acted in more than way in accordance with one's will] and undetermined by someone or something else." (22)

Note all of the theological connections. What Kane calls the imagined world (i.e, a world in which God does all of the will-setting) is what many theologians and church-goers regard as the actual world. If Kane is right, then all of those theologians and church-goers are mistaken (and so should change the way they think and speak about God's involvement with the world).

Comment upon Kane's claims here. Is he right about this? Where does he go wrong, if anywhere?

Be sure to interact with each other. And again, be sure to take advantage of this opportunity to have directed, focused conversation on such matters.

The Consequence Argument

This is perhaps the shortest blog post I've done: So what do you make of The Consequence Argument?

Starting to Think about the Problem of Free Will

Here's a nice presentation of the problem of free will by our good friend Peter van Inwagen (who has thought a lot about this matter):

http://www.closertotruth.com/video-profile/What-is-Free-Will-Peter-van-Inwagen-/1090

Here's what I want you to do:

(1) Watch the video carefully. Watch it again if you have to (and take notes).
(2) Evaluate the claims/arguments offered. What's one to do here with this problem?

Be sure to interact with each other. Take advantage of the opportunity.

Merricks Against Some Other Kinds of Dualism (and The Big Question)

We're now considering in class Merricks' reasons for thinking that the Incarnation gives us good reason to reject the view that a human person is identical to an immaterial soul and accept instead the view that a human person is identical to a physical substance (an organism, perhaps).

Here are some arguments that Merricks offers against other views of the human person. We won't get to discuss these in class (I think).

Against Emergent Dualism

Emergent dualism is a view defended by some folks (including Christians like William Hasker) according to which (very roughly) the immaterial soul emerges from the complex interactions of the physical brain. (Hasker writes: "As a magnet generates its magnetic field, so an organism generates its field of consciousness. Corresponding to the current passing through the wire that generates the electromagnetic field, there are processes in the neurons of the brain and nervous system that generate conscious awareness. This consciousness--the mind or soul, as we call it--is a real thing in its own right, distinct from the generating organism."

Merricks offers a quick Incarnation argument against this kind of view: "Hasker (1999) takes a soul's having a body to be that body's generating that soul. This bodes ill for the Incarnation--surely the body of Jesus does not generate God the Son--so I shall set Hasker's account aside." (See fn. 5 on p. 283.)

What do you make of that argument?

Against Composite Substance Dualism

Composite Substance Dualism, you'll recall from Dean Zimmerman, is the view that a human person is identical to a composite of immaterial soul and physical body. So, on this view, a human person is not identical to an immaterial soul. Nor is a human person identical to a physical body. Rather, a human person is identical to the composite of soul and body. So, you have a soul and you have a body.

Merricks (and Zimmerman, too) offer this argument against Composite Substance Dualism: "This is a minority view among dualistic philosophers, and for good reason. For, if there are souls, they have mental properties. Persons have mental properties, too. So the dualist who denies that a person is identical with a soul must say that there are two objects with mental properties (a person and her soul) where normally we think that there is one." (See fn. 2 on p. 282. To see Zimmerman's presentation of the argument, go to p. 20.)

What do you make of that argument?

Finally...The Big Question:

All things considered, what view of the nature of human persons are you leaning toward, and why?

Be sure to interact with each other! My guess is that you won't always have this kind of opportunity.

Dualism/Materialism and Christianity

In class we're talking about whether substance dualism (the view that we just are immaterial, non-physical souls) or materialism/physicalism has the advantage when it comes to Christianity.

Peter van Inwagen seems to think that materialism at least fares no worse than substance dualism given Christianity while Trenton Merricks seems to think that materialism is best supported by the biblical data and best makes sense of core Christian doctrines like the Resurrection and the badness of death. (We'll see later how he thinks it best makes sense of the Incarnation as well.) Alvin Plantinga (we've seen) seems to think that Christianity better supports substance dualism over materialism.

So, at this point, what are you inclined to think here? Does taking Christianity seriously give us reason to prefer one view over another? [Bracket off as best you can other considerations germane to this conversation. Stick to what Christianity itself seems to yield here.]

As always, be sure to interact with each other. Give each other feedback. Make it a conversation, not just a reporting venue.

Peter van Inwagen on the Mind-Body Problem

It's video time again! Yea!

Here's Peter van Inwagen on the (so-called) mind-body problem. We'll be reading van Inwagen soon enough, so to prepare it might be nice for you to hear him talk through this issue just a bit.

Note particularly his comments on dualism and (more specifically) his brief remarks on whether appealing to theism will help dualism.

So, your task: Talk through what you take to be some of his key claims. Does he make some good points? Can you think of any decent criticisms?

Here's the link: http://www.closertotruth.com/video-profile/Why-a-Mind-Body-Problem-Peter-van-Inwagen-/150