Merricks Against Some Other Kinds of Dualism (and The Big Question)

We're now considering in class Merricks' reasons for thinking that the Incarnation gives us good reason to reject the view that a human person is identical to an immaterial soul and accept instead the view that a human person is identical to a physical substance (an organism, perhaps).

Here are some arguments that Merricks offers against other views of the human person. We won't get to discuss these in class (I think).

Against Emergent Dualism

Emergent dualism is a view defended by some folks (including Christians like William Hasker) according to which (very roughly) the immaterial soul emerges from the complex interactions of the physical brain. (Hasker writes: "As a magnet generates its magnetic field, so an organism generates its field of consciousness. Corresponding to the current passing through the wire that generates the electromagnetic field, there are processes in the neurons of the brain and nervous system that generate conscious awareness. This consciousness--the mind or soul, as we call it--is a real thing in its own right, distinct from the generating organism."

Merricks offers a quick Incarnation argument against this kind of view: "Hasker (1999) takes a soul's having a body to be that body's generating that soul. This bodes ill for the Incarnation--surely the body of Jesus does not generate God the Son--so I shall set Hasker's account aside." (See fn. 5 on p. 283.)

What do you make of that argument?

Against Composite Substance Dualism

Composite Substance Dualism, you'll recall from Dean Zimmerman, is the view that a human person is identical to a composite of immaterial soul and physical body. So, on this view, a human person is not identical to an immaterial soul. Nor is a human person identical to a physical body. Rather, a human person is identical to the composite of soul and body. So, you have a soul and you have a body.

Merricks (and Zimmerman, too) offer this argument against Composite Substance Dualism: "This is a minority view among dualistic philosophers, and for good reason. For, if there are souls, they have mental properties. Persons have mental properties, too. So the dualist who denies that a person is identical with a soul must say that there are two objects with mental properties (a person and her soul) where normally we think that there is one." (See fn. 2 on p. 282. To see Zimmerman's presentation of the argument, go to p. 20.)

What do you make of that argument?

Finally...The Big Question:

All things considered, what view of the nature of human persons are you leaning toward, and why?

Be sure to interact with each other! My guess is that you won't always have this kind of opportunity.

Dualism/Materialism and Christianity

In class we're talking about whether substance dualism (the view that we just are immaterial, non-physical souls) or materialism/physicalism has the advantage when it comes to Christianity.

Peter van Inwagen seems to think that materialism at least fares no worse than substance dualism given Christianity while Trenton Merricks seems to think that materialism is best supported by the biblical data and best makes sense of core Christian doctrines like the Resurrection and the badness of death. (We'll see later how he thinks it best makes sense of the Incarnation as well.) Alvin Plantinga (we've seen) seems to think that Christianity better supports substance dualism over materialism.

So, at this point, what are you inclined to think here? Does taking Christianity seriously give us reason to prefer one view over another? [Bracket off as best you can other considerations germane to this conversation. Stick to what Christianity itself seems to yield here.]

As always, be sure to interact with each other. Give each other feedback. Make it a conversation, not just a reporting venue.