In class we are working through the Zimmerman piece to try to get a handle on the big-picture varieties of dualism one might endorse. As you consider those varieties, do any strike you (at this very early stage in the game) as being more plausible than the rest? Or do they all strike you as being equally plausible (or, perhaps better, implausible)? And, of course, why?
Note that by favoring one dualist view over the others, you are not thereby committing yourself to actually accepting that dualist view. You may think one dualist view is more plausible than the other dualist views, but also think that none are more plausible than (one or more of) the non-dualist (or materialist/physicalist) positions.
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It would seem that substanence dualism follows the guidelines of Scripture. My understanding of substanence dualism states that "the something more" does not rest with the body in death, but passes on to the "after life." Whether or not one believes that at death our "souls" transport into the heavenly realm or not, the stance remains that substance dualism believes in "the something more."
ReplyDeleteCraig Farrell
My understaning of property dualism is that the mind continues on at death. I am not sure if the mind is considered "the something more" or not.
Even Zimmerman stated though that the is not a clear distinction between the two.
Composite substance dualism seems to be the most typical appeal of Biblical-Christian theology. I am having some difficulty discerning the different types of dualism, but this notion of a non-material thinking soul combined with a physical body (substance dualism) follows a traditional Christian understanding of the human person. Currently, I tend to believe this interpretation simply because I do not find convincing reason to believe any of the other views. I admit, though, that I really haven’t thought to far into the metaphysics of the human person in the past, so I feel like I have much to learn in this class.
ReplyDeleteI am starting to find materialism (as it interprets the make-up of the human person) intriguing. I recall in the introduction/chapter that that this view is becoming increasingly popular even in Christian-philosopher circles. I am quite interested to hear a defense of this view in compatibility with Christianity.
I do have one big question concerning any dualism involving both material and immaterial parts of the person. I believe Zimmerman might have also raised this question: how could these two interact? Anybody have any thoughts in regard to this question???
---William Kelly---
Personally I real don’t know what form of Dualism I prefer, but I am siding with some form of substance dualism. Cedarville’s bible department seems to be composite dualism. In most of the bible classes I have had so far they have highlighted the fact that God created man with a body and a soul and he did not do that as an accident. I think this is to combat a monistic substance dualism that seems to be fairly common in the church today.
ReplyDeleteI haven't thought much about this topic in the past, though it was brought to my attention last summer in a discussion with a guy from the Denver area. In the conversation, he mentioned a Christian version of substance materialism. He didn't delve into it, so I am curious to see what exactly that would look like. In particular, I am curious to know how that would be compatible with the resurrection: is there a resurrection in materialist theology?
ReplyDeleteCurrently, I think I hold to some form of substance dualism, mostly because that's what's always been talked about in the circles I grew up with. And, it seemed reasonable to hold to, it didn't seem to contradict with the Bible so far as I could tell. However, a critical point that I think must be pressed is: how does the "other" substance (spirit/soul?) interact with the physical? This really seems to be critical. How does it work? Is it like Peter Pan and his shadow? Are our "souls" sown onto us with some kind of magical thread? Do our souls possess our bodies? Are they just kind of there, pumping "soul juice" through our minds like the heart pumps blood through the body? How does it work? I guess that is the really curious question that I have regarding substance dualism.
Lastly, both phyiscalism and property dualism (despite the fact that they are supposedly the exact opposite) seem to possess a similar flaw. Neither of them seems to give full enough explanations for why in the world we perceive as we do. It seemed like (and perhaps I'm overgeneralizing) there was a good (perhaps accurate) description of how the brain works. But, they didn't really seem to offer a good way to explain why we perceive things as we do.
- Kaleb M.
My tendency, at this point, is to suspend judgment with respect to the 'mind-body' problem. I tend to think that there is one good argument for thinking that my self is distinct from my body, but I have not yet seen a plausible account of interactionism; and, as it seems to me that interactionism must first be plausible in order to accept dualism, I cannot as of yet accept dualism. Thus, my tendency is to suspend judgment about the 'mind-body' problem.
ReplyDeleteBlake H.
I realized, after posting, that my previous comments were a bit imprecise and not quite thought through as much as I prefer. (This seems to be the downside of waking up and posting before one's head clears.) I shall thus make a few corrections.
ReplyDeleteFirst, there is what seems to me to be a good argument for substance dualism - namely, that since it is conceptually possible that I could exist apart from my body, there is some reason to think that I do not possess the same properties as my body, which is just to say that my self and my body are not identical (since, if they were, they would have identical properties). This argument is only strengthened by the fact that, if we were to reject the idea that a mere conceptual base were sufficient to suppose that two things are not identical, then we would have to do so in all other cases, which seems clearly unacceptable. The argument seems to draw much of its strength from this plausible assertion.
However, the difficulty I see with substance dualism is that it seems to demand a plausible account of interactionism; but, as I have not yet seen any such plausible account, I do not see the rational demands of substance dualism being met and, thus, I tend to think that I cannot (yet) accept it.
With respect to property dualism, which avoids the aforementioned difficulty, I see, as of yet, no good reason to suppose that purely non-physical properties exist. There is a moderately strong reason to suppose that such properties do not exist in us, I suppose, since progress in science has shown that our life, both physical and mental, can be plausibly expressed in purely physical terms. (I say 'moderately strong reason' since I have read relatively little on this topic.) So my tendency with respect to property dualism, then, is to believe (for now at least) that there is no good reason to think such properties exist in us and to believe that there is at least a moderately strong reason to believe that there are no such properties.
So, in short.... I'm suspending judgment on substance dualism, since the only good argument I've seen for it requires (for me) suspension of judgment. I tend to disbelieve in property dualism, if only slightly, because of the lack of reasons in favor of property dualism and a moderately strong reason against property dualism. Where does this put me on the 'mind-body map'? I suppose I'm currently in the materialist camp, since I currently have no good reason to suppose that any kind of dualism (or idealism, for that matter) is the case, and I do have at least some good reason to suppose that we can be understood to exist in purely physical terms, which is equivalent (if only roughly) to materialism.
Blake H.
P.S. Will, with respect to your question about how the material and the immaterial interact, this is a difficult concept to defend. (In contrast, it is quite easy to criticize or, at least, much easier to criticize than to defend.) It seems to me that someone who adheres to substance dualism need adhere to some form of interactionism, as well; and, in order to adhere reasonably to interactionism (and thus substance dualism), a plausible account of interactionism needs to be sketched.
ReplyDeleteNote that the difficulties facing interactionism are not necessarily limited to the human constitution. Presumably, God's interaction with the physical world would involve some sort of interactionism. If no plausible account can be sketched, perhaps this is reason to doubt whether God could interact with the physical world.
Blake H.
Blake, I dig your statement at the end of your last post, the one about God's interaction in the physical world. It's something I will want to think about later.
ReplyDeleteRegarding some of Will's question: I am looking at the Cowan and Spiegal article now, which mentions some theories for how the mental/physical interact with one another. In the earlier parts, it seems to mention interactionism (which Blake talks about) and occasionalism, which seem to be 'majority opinion among dualists.' I'm sure you've read/will read it, but interactionism claims mental states (pleasure/pain) are somehow influenced by body stimuli.- That really doesn't seem to answer the question. The reading also mentions occasionalism, which lumps mental activities into the soul and states the body/soul are causally independent, and God has coordinated mental/physical events to happen on occasion with one another.- I am not really sure I get what that actually means. If anyone else does, let me know.
Of the mentioned theories, I think substance materialism makes a lot of sense; I like that it offers a wholistic picture of a person and mental and physical feel less divisible. It's easy to like this view on a theoretical level, but when I start to think about research on the brain, all of the dualist theories seem a little less likely.
This is a really interesting discussion to have. Part of me has always kind of secretly suspected that physicalism is true (this is the cynical and depressing side of me). I think, "really, what evidence do we have that there is anything beyond this physical world? I bet everything's just chemical reactions in my brain."
ReplyDeleteBut coming from a Christian standpoint, a composite substance dualism seems to be the best choice. At bottom, it seems to be just as logically tenable as physicalism or property dualism. And then given the (seeming) weight of Scriptural evidence, it seems that composite substance dualism would be the best choice. However, I fully recognize that this reading of Scripture is through the lens of the conservative Christian tradition I grew up in.
From a historical standpoint (yeah, I'm majoring in history--guess I'm not getting a job like you philosophy majors!), it is interesting to note that physicalists often use Occam's Razor to argue against dualists, when in fact the original formulation of Occam's Razor would support dualism (if in fact an unbiased reading of Scripture renders dualism the most probable solution). He was a monk in the Middle Ages and there is a clause in his "razor" that mentions God's revelation as a source of authority. I guess that part got dropped as time went on.
I, like many others, wonder about how the immaterial can interact with the material. And I never suspected anyone would bring up Moaning Myrtle in a philosohpy class, so kudos on that! :)
--Faith B.
With respect to the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the dead and the mind-body problem, and for a Christian materialist view on the matter, see Peter van Inwagen's essay "I Look for the Resurrection of the Dead and the Life of the World to Come" here: http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/all/profiles/van-inwagen-peter/. The essay can be found on that page.
ReplyDeleteBlake H.
I can see why property dualism(the idea that there is one substance, the physical, and two properties, both physical and mental) is an attractive theory. However, it seems like there are more things in life that we come to know/experience than just the physical. I know that's confusing, but I'm still thinking about that one. Also, i'm not sure if i find it super convincing that the mental is a property of the physical. Why can't my "soul/consciousness(call it whatever you want)" be seperate from the physical? It seems strange for me to comprehend a consciousness that can exist independently from the physical and still hold to property dualism(without other reasons). So, I guess substance dualism is still on the table for me(Yippe?).
ReplyDeleteI know that Materialism isn't a dualism, but I have to mention that I find it fascinating. There seems to be some problems that I need to think through, especially with how it interacts with our typical conception of time...or should i say fails miserably to work with it. i hope we discuss it in class!
Oh, and thanks Faith for the comment on Occam's Razor. Also, i think I understand what you mean Blake. Well, at least from my own Disneywold meets Seseme Street understanding of what you wrote. Both forms of dualism don't really grab me and it seems as if I'm left looking into Materialism. Let me know more of what you think about the mental as a seperate entity. I just can't seem to shake the idea that we all have this concept of an independent consciousness(perhaps through conditioning) as well as 1000+ years of historical agreement on that concept. At this point I think i might be more weary of Materialism, although still fascniated(really, how much can change in the time it takes to write a paragraph?).
-Danielle
If I had to choose, I'd say substance dualism (without getting into the sub categories and sub-sub categories of that very broad term) is the most plausible, and as most have already said, seems more in line with Scripture (specifically Paul). 1 Corinthians 15:35+ addresses this issue as it relates to our physical bodies now and our resurrected bodies in Heaven. Verse 50 says that flesh and blood, the perishable, cannot inherit the kingdom of God, but rather "...the perishable must clothe itself with the imperishable, and the mortal with immortality" (v. 53). I'm pretty sure property dualism/physicalism says this type of talk is rubbish because physics can't prove it, but I'm more inclined to believe the Bible rather than fallible men, albeit intelligent, philosophizing men.
ReplyDeleteWho knows, though? Maybe I just like to believe I have a soul and a place to spend eternity after I die.
In response to Kaleb, and anyone else who may have asked some form of the question as to how the body and soul can interact, I will offer my humble opinion. Which is this: Causal overdetermination tends to treat the mind and soul as doing the same thing, informing the physical, which logically leads to the conclusion that we don't even need souls if our brains are capable of such activity. While interactionism (or occasionalism, still don't know if they fall under the same classification, but let's say they do) says they are independent of each other, but often associated because God made it so our "body (brain) activities occur on the 'occasion' of certain mental states (such as thoughts or choices) and mental states (such as sensations) occur on the 'occasion' of certain bodily states (such as hand or eye movement)" (Cowan 205). Unfortunately, we don't have any way to prove if that theory is true or not. All that to say, I'm not entirely sure we can really pinpoint the soul like that. Does it inform our thinking? Does it inform how we act? I'd say a it's some of both. Also keep in mind that, as a Christian, I look at the world through the lens of God's Word, which means I believe that only humans have souls because we are created in God's image.
In conclusion, my way of thinking is heavily persuaded by faith in God's Word, so feel free to let me know if I'm way off track here.
-Alyson
I tend to find the problem of interaction (interactionism, I suppose) between non-physical and physical components to be the strongest argument against substance dualism. However, on the other side, it is hard to support physicalism if only because of gut instinct. It seems to me that I have a non-physical mind that cannot be reduced to a purely physical explanation. Consciousness, perhaps in my ignorance, seems to be more complex than physical accounts can plausibly explain. So, I suppose that property dualism is attractive because it accounts for the presence of distinctive physical and non-physical properties, yet it avoids the objection of interaction, and I also lean towards substance materialism. But like I said, I am fairly ignorant to these matters at it stands (and it’s tough to say more without the material in front of me, so I will plan on posting at a later point regarding specifics), so that is just a leaning, not a full-on espousal of substance materialism or anything (that might get interesting). There are a few aspects of substance materialism which seem a bit odd, but I will touch on those when I have a chance…
ReplyDeleteTim.
Am I the only one who finds this entire discussion just bizarre? I’m really enjoying it – Kim and I were cracking up at how absurd but beautiful it is to just sit around at lunch, discussing these theories of the nature of things… But gosh, this is ridiculously hard stuff.
ReplyDeleteI also feel so unfamiliar with the terms that are being used to describe these phenomena and ideas of reality, so I imagine I won’t use the terms totally properly, but I hope I can convey what I’m trying to say in spite of a lack of vocabulary.
Basically, I kind of think that physicalism (if by physicalism we mean that everything is physical (and by physical I think I am implying visible and tangible, if that’s not already included in the definition) might seem almost plausible, and that all processes which occur are reduceable to a physical level – or at leat, that we can see physical changes corresponding to anything possibly non-physical. I don’t think we can use the argument from “complexity” to oppose physicalism, since it sure seems that the physical workings of our bodies and the rest of the universe seem sufficiently complex.
But the essence of feeling… maybe we can describe what occurs simultaneously with our feelings of pleasure and pain, hunger, discomfort, emotions like joy, etc. And I guess what’s missing there is an understanding of what life means… at the risk of resurrecting my “clone girl” nickname, I do feel like it is important to mention the fact that we have not been able to reproduce life without, ha, cloning something already living, and at that point, I don’t know if we’ve reained the essence of real life, real consciousness, everything that’s frequently supposed to go along with life… hm, I’m not sure what I’m talking about, except that machines do not seem to experience pain or any other sensations, even when malfunctioning or whatever. So from that it seems that there must be something invisible, and intangible (and therefore non-physical?) that is inherent to life – at least, human life.
I’m not sure why it is thought that there must be a physical cause to bring about a physical result, and I forget whether or not substance dualism requires that. Thus far, I think I lean towards substance dualism, but I can’t quite remember why.
I feel like this is a really dumb blog. I do not understand well enough yet what we are talking about to feel like I am contributing anything to the conversation...
oh, and by my "this is a dumb blog" comment, I meant my own, specific post, not the entire blog. I'm not saying this was a dumb assignment. Hope it didn't come across that way.
ReplyDeleteI, for the most part, think I would agree with Chad. I was in mostly the same Bible courses as Chad. And I would agree that there seems to be a purposeful direction towards composite dualism. I think in addition to what Chad said, this view takes on the question of what is better life or death. It seems to take a strong stance saying we are here in the body and that is the way it is supposed to be. We should not be looking for a Platonic escape from the body, especially if that escape is death.
ReplyDeleteI think I find the combination of property dualism and substance dualism to be the most compelling. I appears, at least to this point, logical the extract thought from the physical and yet also thought, or the mind, does that encapsulate all of who we are. That is where it would seem substance dualism makes the most sense in addition to property dualism. Substance dualism denies Physicalism and that is what compels me to think it most logical.
-Joseph Paige
Danielle,
ReplyDeleteIt seems to me that any sort of thinking thing we posit will interact with our bodies. For instance, we form intentions with respect to some action A, and we decide to perform A. Our intentions somehow trigger brain events from which follow actions. So, as you see, it would seem that our common 'mental' experiences interact with our bodies. But, of course, if we suggest that our 'mental' is non-physical, then we return to problems associated with interaction. What seems more plausible, at least for the moment, is to suggest that our 'mental' is physical (or mostly physical), and can be roughly equated with our brain. This would seem to provide a more plausible explanation of how certain intentions serve as the cause of physical actions, since the intentions and the means of carrying them out are brain-events (i.e., purely physical events).
Blake H.