I have some interesting, relevant (short) videos for you to watch.
First, we read Dean Zimmerman's essay where he lays out a taxonomy of dualisms. Here's Zimmerman discussing these matters in an interview format:
http://closertotruth.com/video-profile/Can-a-Person-be-a-Soul-Dean-Zimmerman-/599
Second, we have considered Alvin Plantinga's "Materialism and Christian Belief". Here's a video where Plantinga presents his anti-materialist argument in an interview format:
http://closertotruth.com/video-profile/Is-the-Person-All-Material-Alvin-Plantinga-/593
Watch these brief videos and respond to them. You might consider what Zimmerman said and affirm it, object to it, raise questions about it, etc. Just be sure to say what reasons you have for affirming, objecting, or questioning it. And the same for Plantinga's argument. Affirm it, object to it, question it, etc. Just be sure to say what reasons you have for doing what you're doing.
And interact with each other!
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The Zimmerman interview seemed to be more conveying information about the different views out there than arguing in particular for any specific one (much like Zimmerman’s introductory article). He seems to define substance dualism much as we have in class – it is the denial of physicalism, and our mental capabilities involve a substance that is ‘unlike’ material stuff. Who I am involves a “a different kind of stuff”. Zimmerman further indicates that the most common dualism postulates that the ‘I’ (whatever that is) is in time, but not in space. This seems to me, like a reasonable notion – how else would our mind be able to associate things in a time-sequence-causality sort of way? The one argument he mentions in defense of dualism is that he thinks of himself as a definite sort of thing, while the body is a sort of vague thing (He points out that when a skin cell slits off at what point would that cell become not me according to a physicalist point of view). This also seems like a troubling question that is put to the materialist.
ReplyDeletePlantiga - What an interesting fellow! I personally thought that his whole beetle analogy-argument thingy was junk. He said something like, “I can imagine going over to the mirror… and wow I am a beetle”. Ok. He might be able to imagine that, but I certainly cannot. I am having trouble understanding why he used this specific example. Anyway, the main point of that argument essentially got at the Possibility Argument. After listening to Plantiga present his case, I think I find myself agreeing with the interviewer who thought that the argument was circular. Plantiga struck me as saying something like, “I can imagine it; therefore it is possible”. He claimed that ‘I’ (whatever it is) has the additional property of “possibly existing when B (body) doesn’t” - therefore, I am different from B. My response: ‘I’ only have that property if indeed it is possible for ‘I’ to exist when B doesn’t. If I just am my body, then it would not be possible for ‘I’ to exist when B doesn’t. BASICALLY, I think Plantiga’s argument is circular and begs the question. It is assuming that which it is trying to prove. He also present the argument of intentionality which I would like to hear spelled out a little more specifically, but seemed like it might have some merit.
Any thoughts…
---William Kelly---
I was confused about the part when Zimmerman was recapping Cartesian thought and said that we were “in time, but not in space.” Does he mean that both body and mind are in time? If I was a dualist, I would tend to think that the reverse is true. That the consciousness is not in time while the body is. I might be missing what Zimmerman was saying, but he said that we experience time in episodes, one after another. Ok, but what happens when our minds are able to replay things in the past, or prophets from the Bible were able to see into the future. I understand that memories are not really a trip back in time, but some seem to affect people to a strong psychological degree that it does seem real, or at least has real consequences on the physical. Will, you seemed to understand what he meant, so if you happen onto the blog again I’d love to hear what you think. You also mentioned his argument in defense against materialism(the whole dead skin falling off idea). Is it silly for me to consider that I(in a completely material sense) am a being that accounts for skin falling off while still retaining who I am. I’m not sure why the shedding skin thing causes so much trouble, so I’d love any help.
ReplyDeleteI’m sorry, I just can’t get with Plantinga’s example of waking up as a Beetle. The man is brilliant, but if he can actually imagine himself(including his human desires, fears, intellect) existing in the body of an insect ,then I’m concerned. If I were a beetle( as in ACTUALLY a bug) then I probably wouldn’t care about or understand half of the things I(human me) think about. Does a beetle care about the freshman 15 or if we’re actually going to be able to give Haiti support? No. Not unless she’s waiting for that discarded Twinkie or happens to be a beetle in Haiti.
On a more focused note, his description of A as his soul and B as his body is evidence for dualism. The fact he can conceive of A and B being separate seems to be some sort of ontological argument for dualism? But what if I can conceive of A and B as only existing together? That seems right since I can’t imagine me X, still being X if the all the parts(A and B) aren’t there.
So, I would love any suggestions from you guys. I wonder if I’m missing Plantinga’s point or misunderstanding his argument.
Danielle
Riddle me this, riddle me that.
ReplyDeleteDanielle in response to your statement about memories and the ‘soul’ being out of time I would disagree with you . While it may be possible for the soul to travel throw time due to divine intervention the soul is still tied to time. My reasoning for this is that I experience time linearly even when I remember something from the past I see it differently and less clearly then when it happened to me for real. Another reason I have for thinking that the soul exists in time is how we experience time: we cannot be at several different times at once. For all of you that have read or watched Watchmen Mr. Manhattan sees time differently than the normal person his mind seems to exist outside of time, at times he’ll even make comments like I’m explaining this to someone when it won’t happen until later in the story. We can to do that time is not laid out in front of us. This is my objections if anyone has anything else to say please responded to this.
The second think that I wanted to responded to is something that Danielle and Will both brought up: Plantiga’s B I separation. Basically he said that I am separate from my body because I can conceive of myself existing while my body does not. They way I understand this argument is that I can imagine myself existing when y body does not (whether it be by me being in heaven or by changing into a bug) I cannot imagine the same about my body I cannot imagine my body existing while my body does not (it is nonsense) so there is something that is difference between me and my body. If I got this wrong please tell me.
--Chad Goodremote--
I'm curious about the time/space claim also. How do we know that our selves are not bounded by space in some meaningful way? At present, I seem to be somehow tied to my body (not that I am platonically claiming that this bondage is a bad thing). If this is the case, then my self is in fact bounded in space, although this fact does not of course imply that I am indentical to my body. Am I misunderstanding what Zimmerman means by this phrase?
ReplyDeleteI really appreciated Zimmerman's acknowledgement that simply arriving at the conclusion that there is such a thing as a soul doesn't prove any other statements such as "the soul exists when the body does not," much less any remotely related claims a Christian theist may wish to put forth.
As to Plantinga's (very distracting!) beetle argument, yeah, Chad, I would say your synopsis of his argument is right on. And I would also agree with Danielle that it seems related to the ontological argument, which isn't taken terribly seriously by most people anymore.
--Faith B.
About Zimmerman's time/space claim and in response to Faith, both are assuming that the soul defines the person rather than the body. Zimmerman refers to the body (anything material, really) as vague things, whereas he likes to think of himself as being a precise thing. Unlike the body, which loses skin cells and particles, the soul cannot gain and lose parts rapidly. Hence, though his body will eventually decay, he believes he will not. I don't think he is denying that our bodies are bounded by space. Rather, the essence of who we are (the soul) is not. It could also be true that I am wrongly interpreting what Zimmerman said, so do tell if you disagree or have a better explanation.
ReplyDeleteFurthermore, Zimmerman discussed the spectrum of positions on whether or not the soul exists, but he never came to a definite conclusion except to imply that there is such a thing as a soul. What a person does with that knowledge is up to them, or so Zimmerman seems to think.
Moving onto Plantinga, I have to agree with the interviewer on this one! The argument is circular, and not at all stable enough to convince someone who is a materialist to think differently. Personally, I'm not a materialist, but I'm also not sure I completely side with Plantinga. I definitely wouldn't use his argument in a legitimate discussion of dualism. Is it possible to think of myself as, say, a beetle? Yes, it's possible, but is it probable? Would I still be me in a different material body? I don't know because I can't really prove it. Plantinga also says that human beings can think about other things that are totally remote from them, which means there has to be a source of intentionality apart from a purely material aspect. What in the world does that even mean? Yes, it's true that I can think about things that happened in the past, but that doesn't mean I think about them accurately. How does this part of the argument even relate to the rest of what Plantinga is saying? Thoughts, anyone?
-Alyson
Plantinga,
ReplyDeleteIn class Dr. G. discussed how saying something is possibly possible meant that it is possible. I do not think that Plantinga went inot a cirrular argument, just that the "brain doctor" was not understanding what was being said. To be the same ME in a different body is possible if ME is not the body. If it is true that God created You, and the formed the body in the womb, then You are still You, no matter what body you inhabit. As far as the beetle thing, that would stink for me, my family is in pest control.
Zimmerman,
I like how Zimmerman refered to himself as "presise" and not vague. I thought the end of this video left the audience with the question of the night, is there a soul? While Zimmerman discussed reasoning for dualism, he did not concretely answer the question.
Zimmerman did probe the thought of the Body breaking down while the I continued to exist as it always has, without breaking down. The Body also absorbs material that the I will never absorb. Though it would be silly to determine when these events happened, they did happen at a certain time and place, deeming the body bound by time and bound by space. Since the I never iccured any of these changes, it is not bound by time, it will continue on after the destruction of the body, or as Zimmerman note, after the destruction of this body, the I will receive a new one, so the I cannot exist without a body, but it is not the Body or part of the Body.
Craig Farrell
I don't buy Plantinga's argument. I simply cannot imagine myself waking up as a beetle. If "I" woke up as a beetle, it simply would not be me in any relevant sense, and it seems that I am not the only one in this class that shares my inability to imagine Plantinga's scenario. So... I think his argument fails because I see no good reason to think that it is possible for me to exist apart from my body (did it seem unnecessarily ambiguous for Plantinga to call his body "B"? What was the point of that? It's not that I was confused... but... seriously?)
ReplyDeleteAlso, Plantinga assumes that our consciousness and our thought and beliefs and desires are precisely as we take them to be - and from that assumption, he draws the conclusion that material objects cannot have consciousness, thoughts, beliefs, desires, etc. Plantinga has the whole rant about content and how material processes cannot produce content like that which is present in our beliefs... but that's only to assume that our beliefs do in fact have content in the same way that he takes them to have content. Consider Leibniz' mill. You go inside and you see all the gears and material processes, etc. For some reason, Leibniz and Plantinga cannot understand how these sorts of processes can produce consciousness when applied to the context of the human brain, and Plantinga even said that he can see how this is impossible... I don't know how he can draw such strong conclusions. What if humans were simply very, very, very, very, very (a lot more very's) complex machines? Electrical impulses firing over synapses at a tremendous pace, etc, etc. Perhaps out some mental illness (which I like to think is not the case), I can see how purely material processes can produce consciousness, beliefs, desires, perception, thoughts... those things are (or at least could be) purely very, very, very complex physiological reactions to stimuli. There are accepted physiological explanations for sensory stimuli... so why cannot there be, at least theoretically, physiological explanations for beliefs and desires, where brain is the focal point? Think of human consciousness as a mosaic. As it is, we can only perceive the big picture - consciousness, which we take to be something entirely different and unique to non-physical entities. We are not able to see otherwise. We wouldn't be able to tell if our consciousnesses were simply electrical impulses. When you stand back from the picture, you can't see the individual tiles, you can't see the "material causes". But what happens when we go up close? We see the jagged edged, solid colored pieces of the mosaic that look strangely placed, blue pieces next to yellow pieces next to red pieces next to black pieces... we can't see the whole picture, but we can see the "electrical impulses" and the "material explanations". We can see the brute physical processes or explanations for the whole picture of our consciousness... This articulation was random and a little ambiguous, but I think it gets at how I see the issue. I can see how material entities can have consciousnesses and beliefs and desires... whether it is plausible to think that they do or not is slightly off-topic to Plantinga's claims. I simply cannot understand his thinking in this regard because my intuitions are totally different than his, for whatever reason.
Tim.
Yeah, I don't really dig Plantinga's first argument.-I don't really see what it offers us. A possibility I guess, but I don't really think that's a persuasive enough argument. I agree with Danielle....what would we be if we were a different body? We wouldn't have the same concerns.
ReplyDeleteAnd for the record (and to finally put that English to good use), Gregor Samsa doesn't believe he is outside of his body, but sees his body is not a different shape...AND it's a piece of fiction AND a lot of people don't believe he actually did change shape, but went sort of insane.
The 'intentionality' part of his video definitely appeals to my 'intuitive rationality,' though.
Danielle....I took Zimmerman to be saying what you thought. Yeah, I think it is pretty weird now that you mention it...maybe it has to do with platonic forms that don't materialize in our world and therefore don't take up space.
I thought Zimmerman made good points about the bodies' wearing away being a vague production. I guess with this whole skin cell thing not being who I am plays into the bigger argument about my body completely regenerating itself every 7 years. I wonder if our body is just really good at adapting itself and we aren't aware of it...like changing a coffee pot to a new time or something....does that make any sense?
Dean Zimmerman's piece was intriguing, and he often stated or hinted at good questions pertaining the the mind-body problem. I don't have much else to say about his contribution at this point, save that he seems to be a very bright guy.
ReplyDeleteRegarding Plantinga's defense of substance dualism, there are a few things to say.
When Plantinga says he can rationally intuit being distinct from his body, he means to offer the following consideration: Intuition has a positive epistemic status; thus, if I could intuitively envision myself being possibly distinct from my body, then I have good reason to believe (and, presumably, prima facie warrant for) that I have a property that my body does not - namely, "Possibly exists when my body does not." Suppose, however, that a critic were to respond, "No, Plantinga; we don't buy it. Intuition's no good here. Try harder." Well, Plantinga might respond with the following argument:
(1) If rationally intuiting that A and B are distinct has no positive epistemic status, then our regular doxastic practice of rationally intuiting that X's and Y's are distinct has no positive epistemic status.
Think of it this way. I am able to determine that the following propositions are logically distinct: (a) Some action A is morally right and (b) Some action A is morally permissible. How am I able to do this? Well, I simply conceive of circumstances in which someone does something right but not permissible, or something permissible but not right, or whatever. That is, I RATIONALLY INTUIT these distinctions. (And they need not, it seems to me, be actualities.) But of course, if that's no good, then I can't determine such distinctions in that way. But that seems silly, so
(2) But it's not the case that our regular doxastic practice of rationally intuiting that X's and Y's are distinct has no positive epistemic status.
And it would then follow, by modus tollens, that
(3) It is not the case that rationally intuiting that A and B are distinct has no positive epistemic status,
which is just to say that Plantinga's intuition counts for something, epistemically speaking.
Of course, many deny that they have this intuition. Now, I don't think that's a strike against Plantinga's intuition. What I DO think might count as a strike against his intuition is the fact that other people have COUNTER-intuitions. That is, lots of people think the other way: They have the intuition that, if I suddenly were 'beetle-embodied,' I wouldn't be myself. And that might serve as an undercutting defeater for Plantinga's intuition. (There are, it seems to me, other potential defeaters, but I sha'n't mention them here.)
In short, I think Plantinga has offered an argument worth considering. By no means do I consider his argument to be silly or absurd.
Blake H.
Zimmerman said that perhaps when the brain functions in a certain way, it generates something extra (like consciousness or a soul). Further, he stated that one's ability to think/function depends massively on the proper function of the brain. Take it away, and it is not possible to think at all. Perhaps, in fact, "I" cease to be.
ReplyDeleteI have a hard time accepting this view. I guess part of it is because of some of the religious beliefs that I hold. However, I think that it also leaves something to be said about one's identity. It seems to me that "I" am something distinct from my body, that "I" am something more than and bunch of particles interacting and bouncing off of each other.
I felt that Plantinga (both in the reading and in the interview) got at some of what I was thinking in a much clearer way than I have been able to. He gave an argument that could be represented something like what follows (assume A represents "I" or "me" and B represents my body):
1. If A=B, then everything true of A is true of B.
2. If there are possibilities for A that are NOT possibilities for B, then it is not the case that everything true of A is true of B.
3. There are possibilities for A that are NOT possibilities for B.
4. Therefore, it is not the case that everything true of A is true of B.
5. Therefore, it is not the case that A=B.
The possibility that he talks about is that "I" could exist when my body doesn't. So, in essence, he is saying that the fact that "I" have different possibilities than my body means that they are two distinct things.
The other argument he gives is that it seems difficult to conceive that a material object can be about something, that it can intend something else. The brain is a material object, the neurons (despite the fact that they are firing) are material objects. How can those be about something? They can't. It must be the case, then, that there is something other (a mind, a soul?).
At present, I think I find Plantinga's arguments more plausible. However, I didn't really feel like Zimmerman really argued for materialism much. He really just kind of gave an overview of dualism and materialism. Perhaps there are some arguments for materialism that we'll be getting into that pack a bit of punch.
- Kaleb M.
Plantinga’s argument on the possibility of the possibility of existing without the body seems to me to be logically sound. I appreciate Will’s comments about how this argument seems to be begging the question. I feel as though someone who comes at this argument with the preconceived notion that dualism is the truth and materialism is the least likely between the two, will most likely agree with Plantinga’s statement. If they can imagine the possibility of existing outside the body, such as the belief that when we die we leave our bodies but exist in the presence of God in heaven, they will be more inclined to agree with the first idea that there is a possibility of existing outside the body. However, for people like the brain surgeon how can attest for all the complex and intricate inner workings of the brain, will have a hard time understanding how existing outside the body in reality is even conceivable. This is what gives the appearance of circularity. But I think if the materialist could come to the understanding that the possibility of something being possible makes it in fact possible, than they might understand that Plantinga’s logic is surprisingly sound.
ReplyDelete- joseph paige
Dean Zimmerman claimed that because he feels like he is a very precise thing, he survives the destruction of the body, and there is only one of him, these are sufficient reasons for him to think that he is not his body. The body, he says, is vague and ceases to exist gradually.
ReplyDeleteHis argument for the existence of a soul which is different from the body was based on the idea that because brains generate consciousness, which is a new property not found in a body, this consciousness is the property of a new substance. In this way, he employs the same assumption as Plantinga (Leibniz’ law) that if A has a different property than B, then A and B are not the same, right?
I guess I don’t really think that our brain processes are what produce our soul, though I can see why he would think that. It is an appealing idea to think that who we are results from the input of our brains and the way we process that information, and that kind of leaves open this idea of us being different people based on our situations. I also found intriguing his idea that our bodies die gradually, not just when one organ fails or whatever.
In addition to being almost painfully awkward, the Plantinga video disappointed me because I think I was hoping to be convinced of the plausibility of Plantinga’s claims. Instead, well, I was totally unconvinced by his first argument, and his second one I think I still pretty sketchy. I agree with Plantinga that I am not just my body, but I do think that I am the way I am largely because of physical things like my body, situation, etc. My life and soul could still exist in a different body, but would it still be I?
Defining what “I” am will be interesting… can I say that “I” still exist if I am radically different?
Olivia