The Consequence Argument, in standard form, is as follows:
1. There is nothing we can now do to change the laws of nature. 2. There is nothing we can now do to change past events. 3. Therefore, there is nothing we can now do to change the laws of nature and past events. 4. Our present actions are the consequence of the laws of nature and past events. 5. If our present actions are the consequence of the laws of nature and past events, and if there is nothing we can do to change the laws of nature and past events, then there is nothing we can now do to change our present actions. 6. Therefore, there is nothing we can now do to change our present actions.
Premises (1) and (2) seem very plausible. It seems highly unlikely that we could change either the laws of nature or past events.
Premise (4) is true if determinism is true, which we're assuming it is for the sake of argument.
Premise (5) is a rough equivalent of the Transfer of Powerlessness Principle, which I take to be quite plausible.
Premise (6) follows from (3), (4) and (5), and our being unable to change our present actions seems incompatible with our being free with respect to our present actions.
So, I tend to think the argument is spot on. However, there is (at least) one intriguing criticism of the argument by David Lewis, which I will mention here. David Lewis objected that the Consequence Argument wrongly conflated two ways of understanding ability claims. The Consequence Argument addresses
(C2) If I had raised my hand, my act would have been or caused an event which entails not-L (“… would have been or caused a law-breaking event”),
which is just to say that I could not BREAK LAWS, but a somewhat weaker thesis is left unaddressed by the Consequence Argument, namely
(C1) If I had raised my hand, L would not have been true. (“… a law would have been broken”).
So, according to Lewis, I might not be able to break laws, but I can render them false by acting differently than I in fact do; that is, I have the causal ability to act differently, and I had this ability prior to the time of acting.
Of course, it seems to me that Lewis' response doesn't really do much for the compatibilist, for various reasons, but it's an interesting reply.
I find the consequence argument pretty compelling. It seems like it is impossible to argue against determinism (which does not grant it immunity from wrongness) simply because a determinist seems to have a trump card. When someone makes a decision (or thinks he does), the determinist can always point to whatever factors he cites for making his decision and call them environmental factors, and evidence their influence over him as the past and laws of nature which dictate his choices.
I am a little thrown, also, by the can (I am actually capable of)/can (if I tried, I could) distinction. It seems that to the example reproduced at the end of the class handout (the whole I could not jump if I tried not to) could be met with an explanation of how environmental or biological factors had led to that decision. An upbringing in a home that stubbornly insists that each individual is autonomous might result in someone intentionally doing ‘unpredictable’ things simply to prove that she does not fit into any sort of determined mold. But maybe it turns all her random actions are necessary given her upbringing and laws of nature and such.
I agree with Olivia, the Consequence Argument does seem to be pretty compelling. Even if we say that we have a soul we still have to deal with the fact that our minds have been shaped by past events, experiences, and knowledge, like Olivia said a about the kid acting predictable unpredictable. I was even thinking that if it were possible to get a DeLorea with a Flux capacitor and changed the past I think that that would still fit with determinism. If I were to go in the past with my Time machine I would me in the past in my present ( meaning that I still have the same past experiences in my memory and my decisions can still be affected by them). So whatever changes I make in the past are still affected by the past that I have experienced. Even if I were to change things so that I no longer remember a past experience that caused me to make the change, I would have changed them because of the experience . What you the rest of you think. AM I making any sense ?
The argument seems like it's plausible. I have not problem with premises 1, 2, or 3. However, premise 4 is the one I have a hard time swallowing (and thus also 5 and 6). Sure, if one accepts determinism, then the rest of the argument follows. But, one must be convinced or that determinism is true (or at least leaning in that direction) for this argument to carry any weight.
I would agree with Kaleb, the consequence argument is based on a determinist vision of the universe. What bothers me is the definition of "past events." I'm assuming that my previous cognitive processes are included in "past events"? If that's so, then it's arguable that my previous free-will acts (decisions, reason, and so on) are part of "past events." At this point we reach an impasse, because the one holding to the existence of free will, and the one holding to determinism, would each maintain their own definition of "past events," one of which would uphold the argument and the other one of which would destroy the argument.
Related, but not directly to the consequence argument...If we accept God's will/sovereignty as the "determining" factor in the universe, might we not then believe that free will exists? If we as humans were made in the image of God, might not part of that image-bearing be the power of determining (in a limited way)? Just throwing this out there... -Faith B.
Yeah, I agree wholeheartedly with Olivia (that's what we discussed most of the time on Wednesday). Determinism can always pull a 'well that could've been determined based off the past' and I, too, didn't understand the whole 'jumping argument' as a refutation.
Blake, maybe I am just not a good comprehender, but I am not sure what you are saying with your raising hand thing-could you elaborate on that?
I agree with most of you. THe consequence argument does seem deductively strong, prima facie (I recently learned this term so I thought I would use it. For those who don't know it, it means "at first glance"). One point we were discussing in our group was the strength of premise two (or perhaps premise five) in regards to a subtance dualist view of the soul. Premise two states: "There is nothig we can now do to change the laws of nature". If, as according to a substance dualist, the soul is an immaterial substance, then it is very possible that the soul is not bound by the laws of nature. If the soul (or I) am not bound by the laws of nature, then it seems very possible either that premise two be false or premise five be false, as our actions would not be necessary consequences ofthe laws of nature (since the soul, again, would not necessarily be bound to those laws). This is, perahps, an uphill battle, but it seems like a decent point that a substance dualist could raise against this argument. Also, while premise one seems intuitively compelling, this premise seems that it has a lot more going on behind that needs to be clarified (and, in the end, I am not sure that I would accept this as unarguably true).
Will -- the soul might not be bound by the laws of nature but insofar as the soul acts upon the physical world, it must necessarily act through a body. A body, being physical, is bound by the laws of nature. Is there any other way except through a physical body that the soul might interact with the laws of nature, so as to change them? -Faith B.
I guess I won't be adding anything contentious to this discussion, for I too think that the Consequence Argument is quite compelling.
The Compatibilist reply that rejects premise 6 on the grounds that someone has the ability to do otherwise is, in my estimation, quite uncompelling. If I had tried to jump up and down I could have jumped up and down... but the fact is that if I had desired and tried to jump up and down, there would be a different past - an entirely different scenario - and thus an entirely different present in which I am jumping rather than not jumping. In that case, the desire still preceded the action of jumping, and was thus part of the action's past, which is just a DIFFERENT PAST than this one. I do not see that as a refutation of premise 6, which essentially states that there is nothing we can do NOW to change our present actions. My desiring or not desiring to jump THEN determines whether I do in fact jump NOW... but what can I do to change whether I do in fact jump now? I can think of nothing. I could desire NOW to jump in the future (say, in 2 seconds), but that says nothing about my ability to change my present state of action.
I thought Faith made a good point. I'm not sure how a substance dualist would be able to object to premises 1 by stating that the soul doesn't necessarily comply with the laws of nature. That might be a really cool soul, but immaterial things still interact with the laws of nature. Take energy for example. It still obeys the laws of Thermodynamics as far as we can tell. If we have any reason for thinking otherwise, I'd be open to objecting to premise 1. As it is, I think it's defended quite well.
Pretty much like everybody here, I think the C. argument is strong. I don't see how we could object to these premises(maybe...just maaaaaybe linguistically. But I'm not sure how that would work).
I also have no problem with the argument being strong. Even though we might think disproving this argument is necessary for supporting a Free Will theory. I think we should all be okay with a world that might not involve Free Will as we conceptualize it(shh shhhh, that's good, yes...it'll be okay).
Hey Tim, I think you might mean premise (5). At least, I hope you do...b/c I'm not sure who's crappy objection you're reading that they would reject a conclusion, hehe :)
I can't refute it at this point because I'm not sure that the past or laws of nature can be changed, but I'm not totally convinced by it. It's a strong argument for sure, but I'm not a libertarian when it comes to free will, hence I can't agree with this argument. On the other hand, though, as Tim has also said, the compatibilist response to premise 6 (something about jumping up and down, I don't have it in front of me right now) is not convincing either. Let's suffice it to say, I'm not a fan of this argument. Maybe I don't know enough yet. Maybe I never will.
I think the difference in possibly that Blake pointed out is very intriguing to me. I feel pretty hesitant to accept the consequence argument as is. My focus of disapproval would probably be directed towards premise 4 in which determinism is simply accepted as true. This is why Lewis’s argument seems like someone coming and rescuing me from being forced down a path I do not want to go. The argument is this, the mere fact that I raised my hand at the time I did does not mean that the laws of nature as we understand them forced that action for presumably the laws as we know them do not prohibit me not raising my hand. Meaning, it would appear intuitive to think that both action have the possibility of being done. The only difference is that one happened and the other did not. It seems just as much as a cop out to point and same “that is what happened and it could never be done again because the circumstances would be different,” than it is to say “I chose my action and that is why it happened.” Overall I am not “happy” about the Consequence argument.
Say there is a drug addict, and he goes through counseling and becomes nonaddictive. He then becomes saved and thus has the Holy Spirit living within him. He now has his pre-conversion past and his post conversion past. If at the present he comes under a lot of pressure and life starts going down hill, he gets tempted to go back into drugs. He now has conviction telling him not to go into drugs (post conversion past) and the memories of the high and escape (pre-conversion past). He chooses not to go back into drugs because of the conviction (still in present time). a moment late he does decide to do the drugs (the new present). He made two choices within two seconds. 1. to follow conviction and then 2. to not follow conviction. If determinism is true, and our choices are determined by our past and laws of nature, then the addict, who is no longer an addict should have not decided to do the drugs due to his most current past of conversion. Is that correct, or does a determinist include all of the past? I guess I'm not clear on what the past consist of, all of it or just the most immediate. If the past is only physical and cognitive, where does conviction come in? is conviction considered cognitive or physical? the drug addict was convicted (cognitive or physical?) then decided against the conviction.
Say the addict was first thinking about going back into drugs, then conviction came, and based solely on his desire to please God he did not do the drugs. There was no past experience or laws of nature in that decision, just the desire to please God. Would one say then that the desire to please God did not come at the present, but came in the past through conversion? For if he was first willing to do the drugs, he was not interested in pleasing God. But then decided it would be better to please God. All present actions conceived through conviction.
Conviction I don't think, is based on past experiences, only present. it is our choice whether or not to obey conviction, which is in the present. So if conviction is in the present only, and we decide based on our conviction, then the past has no bearing on our choice since its based on a present conviction.-----I think anyways.
For clarification sake: The Consequence Argument is an argument for incompatibilism - that is, the thesis that free will and determinism are incompatible concepts. Buying The Consequence Argument doesn't entail that you believe determinism is true; rather, it just means that you buy into the idea that, "IF determinism is true, then our actions are the consequences of the laws of nature and past events; but neither of those things is up to us; therefore, the consequences of those things aren't up to us." So, the argument aims to show that, if determinism is true, then our actions aren't up to us. But that seems clearly incompatible with our being free with respect to our actions. Thus, The Consequence Argument seems to show that you can't be free and determined. So pick one: free will or determinism.
And David Lewis' point is this: There's a difference in saying that I can break a law and saying that, if I acted differently, then a law would be different than it is. So, I might not be able to bring it about that "I am typing right now" is false, given that I am typing right now; but, if I had stopped typing a minute ago, then the statement "I am typing right now" would not have been true.
I think it has a lot of consequences
ReplyDeleteThe Consequence Argument, in standard form, is as follows:
ReplyDelete1. There is nothing we can now do to change the laws of nature.
2. There is nothing we can now do to change past events.
3. Therefore, there is nothing we can now do to change the laws of nature and past events.
4. Our present actions are the consequence of the laws of nature and past events.
5. If our present actions are the consequence of the laws of nature and past events, and if there is nothing we can do to change the laws of nature and past events, then there is nothing we can now do to change our present actions.
6. Therefore, there is nothing we can now do to change our present actions.
Premises (1) and (2) seem very plausible. It seems highly unlikely that we could change either the laws of nature or past events.
Premise (4) is true if determinism is true, which we're assuming it is for the sake of argument.
Premise (5) is a rough equivalent of the Transfer of Powerlessness Principle, which I take to be quite plausible.
Premise (6) follows from (3), (4) and (5), and our being unable to change our present actions seems incompatible with our being free with respect to our present actions.
So, I tend to think the argument is spot on. However, there is (at least) one intriguing criticism of the argument by David Lewis, which I will mention here. David Lewis objected that the Consequence Argument wrongly conflated two ways of understanding ability claims. The Consequence Argument addresses
(C2) If I had raised my hand, my act would have been or caused an event which entails not-L (“… would have been or caused a law-breaking event”),
which is just to say that I could not BREAK LAWS, but a somewhat weaker thesis is left unaddressed by the Consequence Argument, namely
(C1) If I had raised my hand, L would not have been true. (“… a law would have been broken”).
So, according to Lewis, I might not be able to break laws, but I can render them false by acting differently than I in fact do; that is, I have the causal ability to act differently, and I had this ability prior to the time of acting.
Of course, it seems to me that Lewis' response doesn't really do much for the compatibilist, for various reasons, but it's an interesting reply.
Blake H.
I find the consequence argument pretty compelling. It seems like it is impossible to argue against determinism (which does not grant it immunity from wrongness) simply because a determinist seems to have a trump card. When someone makes a decision (or thinks he does), the determinist can always point to whatever factors he cites for making his decision and call them environmental factors, and evidence their influence over him as the past and laws of nature which dictate his choices.
ReplyDeleteI am a little thrown, also, by the can (I am actually capable of)/can (if I tried, I could) distinction. It seems that to the example reproduced at the end of the class handout (the whole I could not jump if I tried not to) could be met with an explanation of how environmental or biological factors had led to that decision. An upbringing in a home that stubbornly insists that each individual is autonomous might result in someone intentionally doing ‘unpredictable’ things simply to prove that she does not fit into any sort of determined mold. But maybe it turns all her random actions are necessary given her upbringing and laws of nature and such.
I agree with Olivia, the Consequence Argument does seem to be pretty compelling. Even if we say that we have a soul we still have to deal with the fact that our minds have been shaped by past events, experiences, and knowledge, like Olivia said a about the kid acting predictable unpredictable.
ReplyDeleteI was even thinking that if it were possible to get a DeLorea with a Flux capacitor and changed the past I think that that would still fit with determinism. If I were to go in the past with my Time machine I would me in the past in my present ( meaning that I still have the same past experiences in my memory and my decisions can still be affected by them). So whatever changes I make in the past are still affected by the past that I have experienced. Even if I were to change things so that I no longer remember a past experience that caused me to make the change, I would have changed them because of the experience .
What you the rest of you think. AM I making any sense ?
The argument seems like it's plausible. I have not problem with premises 1, 2, or 3. However, premise 4 is the one I have a hard time swallowing (and thus also 5 and 6). Sure, if one accepts determinism, then the rest of the argument follows. But, one must be convinced or that determinism is true (or at least leaning in that direction) for this argument to carry any weight.
ReplyDelete- Kaleb
I made a paper airplane out of it.
ReplyDeleteI would agree with Kaleb, the consequence argument is based on a determinist vision of the universe. What bothers me is the definition of "past events." I'm assuming that my previous cognitive processes are included in "past events"? If that's so, then it's arguable that my previous free-will acts (decisions, reason, and so on) are part of "past events." At this point we reach an impasse, because the one holding to the existence of free will, and the one holding to determinism, would each maintain their own definition of "past events," one of which would uphold the argument and the other one of which would destroy the argument.
ReplyDeleteRelated, but not directly to the consequence argument...If we accept God's will/sovereignty as the "determining" factor in the universe, might we not then believe that free will exists? If we as humans were made in the image of God, might not part of that image-bearing be the power of determining (in a limited way)? Just throwing this out there...
-Faith B.
Yeah, I agree wholeheartedly with Olivia (that's what we discussed most of the time on Wednesday). Determinism can always pull a 'well that could've been determined based off the past' and I, too, didn't understand the whole 'jumping argument' as a refutation.
ReplyDeleteBlake, maybe I am just not a good comprehender, but I am not sure what you are saying with your raising hand thing-could you elaborate on that?
I agree with most of you. THe consequence argument does seem deductively strong, prima facie (I recently learned this term so I thought I would use it. For those who don't know it, it means "at first glance"). One point we were discussing in our group was the strength of premise two (or perhaps premise five) in regards to a subtance dualist view of the soul. Premise two states: "There is nothig we can now do to change the laws of nature". If, as according to a substance dualist, the soul is an immaterial substance, then it is very possible that the soul is not bound by the laws of nature. If the soul (or I) am not bound by the laws of nature, then it seems very possible either that premise two be false or premise five be false, as our actions would not be necessary consequences ofthe laws of nature (since the soul, again, would not necessarily be bound to those laws). This is, perahps, an uphill battle, but it seems like a decent point that a substance dualist could raise against this argument. Also, while premise one seems intuitively compelling, this premise seems that it has a lot more going on behind that needs to be clarified (and, in the end, I am not sure that I would accept this as unarguably true).
ReplyDeleteAny thoughts...
---William Kelly---
Will -- the soul might not be bound by the laws of nature but insofar as the soul acts upon the physical world, it must necessarily act through a body. A body, being physical, is bound by the laws of nature. Is there any other way except through a physical body that the soul might interact with the laws of nature, so as to change them?
ReplyDelete-Faith B.
I guess I won't be adding anything contentious to this discussion, for I too think that the Consequence Argument is quite compelling.
ReplyDeleteThe Compatibilist reply that rejects premise 6 on the grounds that someone has the ability to do otherwise is, in my estimation, quite uncompelling. If I had tried to jump up and down I could have jumped up and down... but the fact is that if I had desired and tried to jump up and down, there would be a different past - an entirely different scenario - and thus an entirely different present in which I am jumping rather than not jumping. In that case, the desire still preceded the action of jumping, and was thus part of the action's past, which is just a DIFFERENT PAST than this one. I do not see that as a refutation of premise 6, which essentially states that there is nothing we can do NOW to change our present actions. My desiring or not desiring to jump THEN determines whether I do in fact jump NOW... but what can I do to change whether I do in fact jump now? I can think of nothing. I could desire NOW to jump in the future (say, in 2 seconds), but that says nothing about my ability to change my present state of action.
Tim.
I thought Faith made a good point. I'm not sure how a substance dualist would be able to object to premises 1 by stating that the soul doesn't necessarily comply with the laws of nature. That might be a really cool soul, but immaterial things still interact with the laws of nature. Take energy for example. It still obeys the laws of Thermodynamics as far as we can tell. If we have any reason for thinking otherwise, I'd be open to objecting to premise 1. As it is, I think it's defended quite well.
ReplyDeletePretty much like everybody here, I think the C. argument is strong. I don't see how we could object to these premises(maybe...just maaaaaybe linguistically. But I'm not sure how that would work).
I also have no problem with the argument being strong. Even though we might think disproving this argument is necessary for supporting a Free Will theory. I think we should all be okay with a world that might not involve Free Will as we conceptualize it(shh shhhh, that's good, yes...it'll be okay).
Hey Tim, I think you might mean premise (5). At least, I hope you do...b/c I'm not sure who's crappy objection you're reading that they would reject a conclusion, hehe :)
I can't refute it at this point because I'm not sure that the past or laws of nature can be changed, but I'm not totally convinced by it. It's a strong argument for sure, but I'm not a libertarian when it comes to free will, hence I can't agree with this argument. On the other hand, though, as Tim has also said, the compatibilist response to premise 6 (something about jumping up and down, I don't have it in front of me right now) is not convincing either. Let's suffice it to say, I'm not a fan of this argument. Maybe I don't know enough yet. Maybe I never will.
ReplyDeleteOnce again, forgot to sign my name....The above 'Anonymous' is Alyson S.
ReplyDeleteI think the difference in possibly that Blake pointed out is very intriguing to me. I feel pretty hesitant to accept the consequence argument as is. My focus of disapproval would probably be directed towards premise 4 in which determinism is simply accepted as true. This is why Lewis’s argument seems like someone coming and rescuing me from being forced down a path I do not want to go. The argument is this, the mere fact that I raised my hand at the time I did does not mean that the laws of nature as we understand them forced that action for presumably the laws as we know them do not prohibit me not raising my hand. Meaning, it would appear intuitive to think that both action have the possibility of being done. The only difference is that one happened and the other did not. It seems just as much as a cop out to point and same “that is what happened and it could never be done again because the circumstances would be different,” than it is to say “I chose my action and that is why it happened.” Overall I am not “happy” about the Consequence argument.
ReplyDeleteSay there is a drug addict, and he goes through counseling and becomes nonaddictive. He then becomes saved and thus has the Holy Spirit living within him. He now has his pre-conversion past and his post conversion past.
ReplyDeleteIf at the present he comes under a lot of pressure and life starts going down hill, he gets tempted to go back into drugs. He now has conviction telling him not to go into drugs (post conversion past) and the memories of the high and escape (pre-conversion past). He chooses not to go back into drugs because of the conviction (still in present time). a moment late he does decide to do the drugs (the new present). He made two choices within two seconds. 1. to follow conviction and then 2. to not follow conviction. If determinism is true, and our choices are determined by our past and laws of nature, then the addict, who is no longer an addict should have not decided to do the drugs due to his most current past of conversion. Is that correct, or does a determinist include all of the past?
I guess I'm not clear on what the past consist of, all of it or just the most immediate. If the past is only physical and cognitive, where does conviction come in? is conviction considered cognitive or physical?
the drug addict was convicted (cognitive or physical?) then decided against the conviction.
Say the addict was first thinking about going back into drugs, then conviction came, and based solely on his desire to please God he did not do the drugs. There was no past experience or laws of nature in that decision, just the desire to please God.
Would one say then that the desire to please God did not come at the present, but came in the past through conversion? For if he was first willing to do the drugs, he was not interested in pleasing God. But then decided it would be better to please God. All present actions conceived through conviction.
Conviction I don't think, is based on past experiences, only present. it is our choice whether or not to obey conviction, which is in the present. So if conviction is in the present only, and we decide based on our conviction, then the past has no bearing on our choice since its based on a present conviction.-----I think anyways.
Craig
For clarification sake: The Consequence Argument is an argument for incompatibilism - that is, the thesis that free will and determinism are incompatible concepts. Buying The Consequence Argument doesn't entail that you believe determinism is true; rather, it just means that you buy into the idea that, "IF determinism is true, then our actions are the consequences of the laws of nature and past events; but neither of those things is up to us; therefore, the consequences of those things aren't up to us." So, the argument aims to show that, if determinism is true, then our actions aren't up to us. But that seems clearly incompatible with our being free with respect to our actions. Thus, The Consequence Argument seems to show that you can't be free and determined. So pick one: free will or determinism.
ReplyDeleteAnd David Lewis' point is this: There's a difference in saying that I can break a law and saying that, if I acted differently, then a law would be different than it is. So, I might not be able to bring it about that "I am typing right now" is false, given that I am typing right now; but, if I had stopped typing a minute ago, then the statement "I am typing right now" would not have been true.
Blake H.