Here's a nice presentation of the problem of free will by our good friend Peter van Inwagen (who has thought a lot about this matter):
http://www.closertotruth.com/video-profile/What-is-Free-Will-Peter-van-Inwagen-/1090
Here's what I want you to do:
(1) Watch the video carefully. Watch it again if you have to (and take notes).
(2) Evaluate the claims/arguments offered. What's one to do here with this problem?
Be sure to interact with each other. Take advantage of the opportunity.
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Van Inwagen describes what he takes to be one of the problems pertaining to free will, this one pertaining to incoherence. He discusses both the Consequence Argument and the Mind Argument. The Consequence Argument contends that, if determinism is true, then our actions are the result of the laws of nature and events in the past; but it's not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are; therefore, the consequences of those things, including our present acts, are not up to us. So, determinism does not seem to be compatible with free will (since determinism is incompatible with our actions being 'up to us'). The Mind Argument contends that free will does not seem to be compatible with indeterminism, since an indeterministic act seems completely undetermined - that is, it is not even determined by us. This, too, seems incompatible with our being free, since it seems incompatible with things being 'up to us.' But, as van Inwagen notes, if free will is incompatible with determinism and indeterminism, then it cannot exist: it is an incoherent thing, since it would be logically impossible.
ReplyDeleteOne possible route that I am currently exploring is whether the Mind Argument addresses only simple indeterminism. If it does, and if there are forms of indeterminism which do not seem incompatible with things being 'up to us,' then the Mind Argument only crosses out one form of indeterminism, which is hardly a threat to the other forms. But I'm not totally sure if there are other forms of indeterminism which differ in a relevant sense.
Blake H.
The Problem of Free Will does seem to present some significant concerns that will need to be evaluated as we consider our understanding of free will. I think that the argument sketched out in the video (and on the handout from class) appears deductively strong, at least at first glance. (P1) Either determinism or indeterminism is true. (P2) If determinism is true, then there is no free will. (P3) If indeterminism is true, then there is no free will. (C) Therefore, there is no free will. As we were discussing in class, premise one seems rather obviously true: either A or not-A. The Consequence Argument seems to support premise two; while the Mind Argument defends premise three. Therefore, the conclusion follows – but this seems to be an unacceptable conclusion. So what then is wrong with the argument?
ReplyDeleteI have not thought through this argument in much depth, but I do think that definitions are going to play a critical role in the evaluation of this argument, especially our understanding of free will. From what I know about compatibilism and libertarianism, these two lines of thought respond to this argument primarily with differing conceptions of free will. I think keeping clear on our definitions will be one of the most critical aspects of our argument analysis.
---Will Kelly---
I have thought about free will before this class, but in a more theological context then a philosophical one. And from my experience the two have their differences.
ReplyDeleteI agree with Will that the argument presented in the video seems rather strong and I really cannot see anything wrong with it. I we do the same thing every time then we are not free, but if we do if differently every time, then it seems that chance controls our actions at not ourselves. I really don’t know if I feel comfortable with accepting this. It seems that we need so freedom to be responsible for our actions, or there can be no just punishment.
First, briefly, I fully agree with van Inwagen that the soul's existence or non-existence does not change the problem of free will in the slightest. Whether it is my brain or my soul that is choosing, the fact of the choice remains.
ReplyDeleteSecond, I'm intrigued by the idea of free will being incompatible with indeterminism. Most of my exposure to free will debate has been in CLT class, so let's be honest here, I haven't been involved in anything like a nuanced presentation of the topic! So now that I've heard of indeterminism, I think it's a very interesting viewpoint. Interesting, but not at this point convincing. If we have free will, I'm pretty sure the world would look much more like a determinist world than like an indeterminist world. If I were to freely choose a different option every time God rewound to the point of choice, I would have to significantly question my current concept of personhood. I definitely buy that indeterminism appears incompatible with free will.
--Faith B.
I can see how indeterminism is incompatible with free will (if we consider indeterminism to be the view that our acts are not determined by us or anything else - they are completely up to chance). I can also see how determinism does not seem to be compatible with free will. But, I wonder if a more nuanced form of either determinism or indeterminism would be compatible with free will. It seems like there must be some sort of "middle" ground between the two. But, I'm not really quite sure what that would look like yet.
ReplyDelete- Kaleb M.
The problem of free will, according to Van Inwagen, can be summed up with two statements. Either free will is inconsistent with the idea that our actions are causally determined by the past (determinism) or it is inconsistent with the idea that our acts are not causally determined by the past (indeterminism). As Van Inwagen has said, "Oh dear." How can this be? Which one is true? One of these statements has to be correct in order for free will to exist.
ReplyDeleteThe Consequence Argument seems to align with the idea of determinism being incompatible with free will. This argument simply concludes that humans have no say in events of the past, nor are we responsible for the laws of nature, hence our actions are determined. There is no free will. The Mind Argument states indeterminism is incompatible with free will because the so-called choices we make are really just a matter of chance. If determinism and indeterminism are both incompatible with free will, then there is no free will.
However, I agree with Van Inwagen that there is free will because there is moral responsibility. Van Inwagen seems to think the Consequence Argument is very strong, but doesn't see a problem with someone abiding by the Mind Argument. I wonder if determinism and indeterminism have been too simplified in this debate. Since I believe God is Sovereign, I believe history is linear, leading up to God's ultimate consummation of His plan, but I also think humans have choices. We are not puppets. I guess my own views seem contradictory as I can only explain them in the way my human mind can perceive God's truth. I don't think indeterminism is a viable option simply because I don't believe in chance, but I also don't think determinism in the way Van Inwagen or John Calvin have described it is completely true, either. The idea that I have no choice (no choice to decide to accept or reject God, no choice in what I have for dinner, no choice in my occupation after graduation) sounds like grounds for blaming God/other people for my own mistakes, failures or discontent in life. As Kaleb and Faith also said, I'm interested in a much more nuanced presentation of both determinism and indeterminism, if there is one.
The above is Alyson's post, by the way.
ReplyDeleteWell... I think that the way in which one responds to the Problem of Free Will depends on how the terms are sparsed out. If determinism is simply defined in terms of the laws of nature and the past (represented in van Inwagen's account), then indeterminism would simply be the denial that the laws of nature and the past necessitate a single future. But that is not necessarily to say that indeterminism is inconsistent with something else determining the future, possibly the agent herself making a free choice through an act of the will that is not determined by the laws of nature and the past - her mind and will retain some determining power. If indeterminism were indeed compatible with this sort of agent causation (correct me if I'm butchering the usage of this term), then it would seemingly be consistent with free will and the mind argument would fail, for indeterminism would not necessitate randomness, and thus not-free actions. Of course, the terminology would be puzzling if it were given in this manner, for "indeterminism" could be consistent with some determining process. But if agent causation were included in the determining processes under determinism, then you a slightly revised account of the Free Will Problem, as posed by van Inwagen, but no obvious manner in which to escape this new formulation... so like I said, I believe much of the problem lies in how the categories of determinism and indeterminism are divided, but as it stands under van Inwagen's formulation, one may have reason to reject the Mind Argument.
ReplyDeleteTim.
1.He defines what it means when we talk about free will. So, free will is just
ReplyDeleteFW=The choice to deliberate and choose to do either (a) or (b).
(P1)Either our acts are causally determined by the past or our acts aren’t causally determined by the past.
If determinism is true our acts are causally determined by the past or
(P2)D= no free will
and if indeterminism is true, then our acts are causally determined by the past
(P3)I= no free will
So, there is no free will(conclusion)
Peter Van Inwagen states that there must be something wrong with either of the arguments then, because free will does seem to exist(I suppose he considers that to be intuitively true. Fine…).
The consequence argument shows that even under determinism free will cannot be true because we would have to be able to change the laws of nature or the past. This argument attempts to to prove the incompatibility of free will and determinism.
The mind argument- If an event isn’t determined by laws of nature and the past and that seems random. If the outcome of A and B is random, then the agent still doesn’t seem to have any control over those events.
2. I completely agree that the consequence argument is the stronger argument. Right now the only objection I can find or think of comes from our book and describes hypothetical problem of compatibilist’s interpreting “can” or “power” differently from incompatibilists. I have yet to hear a very good defense against that objection.
The mind argument is less convincing to me, but for reasons I can yet articulate. Maybe there’s something about a definition that is confusing me or seems misplaced. If I figure out my objection I’ll post again, but as it stands I can’t think of a good one to articulate.
Oh, and I agree with Faith that the soul’s existence seems rather irrelevant to this discussion. If anyone else disagrees I think that could be an interesting argument as well. Cheerio!
-Danielle
I was not aware that free will could be thought of philosophically. I also argued for it in theological tenses. This is very interesting to me, and both arguments stump me. Both arguments are convincing that free will/choice cannot exist. However, it does, not just because of moral fault.
ReplyDeleteWere you ever tempted and the Holy Spirit convicts you to make a certain choice? If you make the choice contrary to your conviction, that might be a deterministic choice. Depending on what is considered "the past" though will depend on how you view choosing for your conviction. To me it is a present choice to follow the leading of the Holy Spirit. My conversion may have introduced me to being sensitive to conviction, but when I make the choice to follow conviction it is a present choice that is not determined by the laws of nature or my past. This is where theology comes and says yes, well the Spirit determined which choice was better so you really never had a choice (if we all follow our convictions all the time).
However being in Metaphysics and not a biblical exegesis course, I can't think of anything to say against the two arguments.
I would disagree about the soul's existence not being important. If the soul is that which thinks, feels and perceives, then it is the soul which makes the decision, or has a key factor in making a decision. Therefore if our decisions are heavily tied to our souls, then any decision we make affects our souls. Maybe. It sounded good in my head.
Craig Farrell
I don't think I'd be able to explain Van Inwagen's arguments better than Will (nice jorb, Will). If either indeterminism or determinism is true, then free will does not exist.
ReplyDeleteObviously, the argument about incompatibility and free will, if determinism is true, shows that free will can't be true.
As for the other, I find the Mind Argument really interesting as a reason to reject determinism. That makes perfect sense to me, although I have a bias. I doubt he'll check the blog again, I think it'd be cool for Blake to talk more about 'simple indeterminism' as opposed to other ones (maybe it was mentioned on our Friday handout...I wasn't in class).
It's so strange to simplify these massive concepts in three line arguments.
Craig – I think that maybe what van Inwagen meant about the (non)existence of a soul being irrelevant to the question at hand is that it just wouldn’t really be helpful. Maybe this is the wrong approach, but it seems to me that we can apply the same arguments to an immaterial entity as we could to a material entity and wind up with the same problem. On what basis is the soul making its decisions? Could it actually make either decision A or decision B, or is it, based on the laws of nature and the history of the world, required to make decision B? If so, it has no free will. If the soul can make decision A or decision B, then it might seriously make either of them. So it is basically up to chance. This doesn’t seem right.
ReplyDeleteI really felt for Van Inwagen when he was expressing how it just seems that things do not make sense… surely there is moral responsibility in the world, but blame presupposes free will, which does not seem to be possible. If, in fact ,we do not have free will (as these arguments seems to establish), then how do we account for the fact that people are held morally accountable for their actions?
I agree whole heartily with Will that the defining of terms in regards to “Free Will” or “Free Choice” is going to be the essential point to analyzing these arguments. For even as Blake has pointed out already, perhaps Van Inwagen has unjustly lumped all forms of indeterminism into one definition that may not fit all forms of indeterminism. I think even the terms “free will” and “free choice” are crucial to understanding whether or not any of these arguments are flawed. As for me, I believe the consequence argument seems to be coherent as I understand it. On the other hand, as Daniel voiced in class what if moral responsibility is not something we should not be so reluctant to give up? Maybe the truth is the we cannot be considered responsible for our determined actions. Either way it would seem “free choice” is not compatible with determinism. The mind argument however seems too vague for me to accept. The terms need to be defined more. I am not sure when the choice occurs. If you are presented with choice a. and choice b. and you are free to choose between either of them why is it that this cannot be free will or undetermined. I feel this is where Van Ingwagen is tripping over terms he has not decided how to define Free Choice. All in all though I am still hesitant and confused being that we just started discussing this subject so I would not assume that I know more about the defining of the terms than Van Ingwagen. So help if you have a better understanding.
ReplyDeleteKim,
ReplyDeleteAs concerns the whole 'simple indeterminism' idea, let me explain myself.
Indeterminism is simply the denial of determinism - that is, it contends that our actions are not the result of the laws of nature and events in the past. Arguably, this does not rule out causation (since, presumably, causal determinism is more than simple causation: it is a thorough-going causation, where everything is causally necessitated by two controllers: the laws of nature and past events); and, if that is true, then it seems there is room for non-deterministic accounts of causation: agent causation, for instance.
The Mind Argument seems asserts that indeterminism (i.e., the denial of determinism) is incompatible with free will, but as I just mentioned, it's not clear that non-deterministic accounts of causation are ruled out. As Tim mentioned, it's possible to re-arrange the argument so as to make it an argument against things NOT being causally necessitated at all, whether by the laws of nature/past events or whatever. But even so, it seems we could still wonder whether non-deterministic accounts of causation were left untouched by the Mind Argument.
Lots of thinking left to do. Maybe this was all crap.
Blake H.