Thursday, April 15, 2010

The Intelligibility Problem for Libertarian Free Will

We are (at long last) embarking on The Intelligibility Problem for libertarianism. Now here's a big task for you: Consider what Kane has to say to this problem and evaluate it (as best you can). Does he have a good response to The Intelligibility Problem?

Be sure to interact with each other!

12 comments:

  1. I don't ever really see Kane addressing the fundamental issue of the intelligibility problem (It is a big chapter, so perhaps I missed something). Kane explains that indeterminism means that "I could have made a different choice given exactly the same past right up to the moment when I did choose" (23) . He then dives into he whole Colorado-Hawaii example. Kane concludes that "one may at first think that there must be some way around the conclusion that if a choice in undetermined, then the agent must have been able to choose otherwise 'given exactly the same past'. But in fact there is no easy way around this conclusion" (23). There, Kane said it himself - "there is no easy way around this conclusion". It would indeed seem very wierd if John is reasonably leaning toward choosing Hawaii and then, by freak chance, found himself choosing Colorado. This just doesn't seem to make sense to me. THis does make it look like what Kane calls a "choice" really just look too arbitrary, too irrational, too random. And, I don't think such random can be held ultimately responsible.

    I think it is interesting that Kane wants to avoid obscure metaphysical appeals, but then he himself goes on to make claim based on ambiguous ideas like "thermodynamic equillibrium" and "micro-indeterminacies at the neuronal level". Not very helpful, Mr. Kane. I think that such claims help only to complicate/confuse th problem - I don't think he really escapes the difficulty of such randomness. Kane claims that the intuition that random cannot bear responsible is deeply ingrained in us, but then he calls us to "break [these] old habits of thought". I think that such intuitions (as Dr. Graves seems to like... :-) should not be easily abandoned. One must give good reason to face off against such intuitiveness - and I just don't think Kane has given sufficient reason to do so.

    ---Will Kelly---

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  2. Kane has failed to provide convincing evidence to refute the Intelligibility Problem. As I understand it, when Kane is discussing indeterminism, he's defending his SFA's. Since Kane's SFA's are indetermined, he needs to show that indeterminism of any sort is compatible with free will.

    First, I want to say that other libertarians who posit some extra substance which gets around the problem are only positing some kind of determinism to overcome the indeterminism. For them, it seems that they must choose compatibilism to defeat the Intelligibility Problem. Kane rejects their explanations, but he doesn't really offer anything more plausible.

    Here's my thing with SFA's, these indeterminate choices. They essentially require the individual to step outside of him/herself while making the decision. Otherwise, the decision would be predicated on the individual's character, attitudes, and deliberation process. This is impossible to accomplish. We are left with indeterminism as a random choice, which is not compatible with any meaningful, full-orbed free will.

    --Faith B.

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  3. Well... I am with Kane in at least one respect - I'm not sure there is anything about Indeterminism that precludes rationality, voluntariness, control, or responsibility. Causation does not entail determinism - and neither does rationality, choice, voluntariness, control, etc. So, it is not the case that an undetermined act is necessarily a random act, but only that there are multiple legitimately possible options. It may be difficult in fact to describe how that would actually work, but Indeterminism, broadly speaking, seems intelligible. What is NOT intelligible is the mechanism that Kane uses to explain Indeterministic free will. As far as I can tell, SFA's are unintelligible no matter how you look at them, and Kane does not provide much help in describing that mechanism. He ridicules "extra factor" theories that are posited to help libertarianism as mysterious (mentioning that others call libertarianism "obscurantism" because of these extra-factor theories)... but the manner in which Kane tries to describe libertarianism through appeal to SFA's does not exactly eliminate any mystery or obscurity. Mr. Kane, how exactly does an act without a sufficient cause or motive happen?? Without answering that question, I'm not sure how one could possibly understand his position well enough to categorize it as intelligible... Is anyone else with me?

    Tim.

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  4. While most agree that a determined act doesn’t seem free, what happens when we also say that an undetermined act is also not free? Since Kane doesn’t want to give up the possibility of free well existing, he has to make it clear how free will can exist in an undetermined world. He makes some good points by arguing that indeterminism, by definition, does not seem to entail humans having a lack of control or a lack of responsibility( I’m guessing that also means ultimate responsibility).
    However, it still isn’t clear how indeterminacy can be sufficiently explained to allow for responsible human control. So, Kane things that he can describe situations where the brain is just primed (by chaos apparently) for micro indeterminacies.

    While this isn’t the entire scope of Kane’s position and defense, it’s representative of my problem with it. I mean, What? No, no seriously…umm..what? Say again? Please…what? I mean, either I’m having an SFA right now or I just have no idea what phrase to use that will describe my confusion best. Somehow, our being in certain states of quandary or moral deliberation opens up the “floor” of our brains for these sort of quantum indeterminacies. I suppose those would give us the ability to have free will in an undetermined world.

    Again, Kane seems to be very intelligent and I’m sure I’m misunderstanding, but I think it would be helpful for him to explain how this all works. I mean, since he’s the one who jumped into the realm of science for philosophical backing. Either make it believable or take a science class.

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  5. In response to faith, you wrote: Since Kane's SFA's are indetermined, he needs to show that indeterminism of any sort is compatible with free will.
    I think Kane would say SFAs are indetermined AND the way of showing how one can have free will in an indetermined world.

    Maybe not. Although I think you are write to critique SFAs as evidence for that.

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  6. ohhhh...we can't go back to edit spelling. Batman intended to spell "write" as "right" in that last post. How embarressing. I suppose it's a good thing Batman isn't anyone you all know personally.

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  7. I'm with you, Tim! Kane's argument that indeterminism does not rule out control, responsibility, rationality etc. is solid. Like Tim, I think, according to this argument, indeterminism is plausible and fairly supported with hypothetical situations (such as the husband/wife arguing example on pg. 27, among others). I'm not convinced, however, by Kane's defense of SFAs. He says that not every action a human makes is self-formed, so how do we decide which actions are self-formed and which are not? Where does the logic or justification for choosing a seemingly free choice (as described on pg. 26) come from? Could it be our pasts inform our decisions whether we realize it or not? Kane is still unclear and vague with his answers to these questions. Also, he says "perhaps we are torn between doing the moral thing or acting from ambition, or between powerful present desires and long-term goals, or we are faced with difficult tasks for which we have aversions. In all such cases, we are faced with competing motivations and have to make an effort to overcome temptation to do something else we also strongly want" (26). This tension and uncertainty, according to Kane, is what forces us to make self-formed decisions. But isn't is external things, such as our pasts, laws, cultural contexts, etc. that define what right and wrong is, or that give up these "competing motivations"? How does this prove that our actions are self-formed, necessarily? Furthermore, the fact that Kane says not all of our actions are self-formed leaves the argument open for compatibilists to say that some actions, then, are determined.

    -Alyson S.

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  8. I'm not sure that his response to the Incompatibility Problem really answers the questions raised by it. I am also unsure whether or not it is answerable for free will without appealing to some sort of "extra factor." And if there is no extra factor, things kind of seem to slide towards the determinism side of things. He gave the illustration about the businesswoman on page 26. He talks about how indeterminacy is involved in her deliberation between calling for help and hurrying off to her meeting. But, it seems like that situation can just as easily (perhaps much more easily) be explained from a deterministic viewpoint. I guess I'm not really sure that SFA's are possible without an appeal to some outside will (a soul perhaps?) acting upon/through the body.

    Also (like Will mentioned), I don't think that Kane's appeal to science was particulary helpful. He says that perhaps there are things going on like "thermodynamic equillibrium" and "micro-indeterminacies at the neuronal level." I guess my question is: is there? Do you have some evidence to support this idea? If there is some evidence and research that has been done that seems to show this, then that's great. But it needs to be cited there. All Kane really seemed to be doing was saying: well, this sound like it'd explain it; let's assume it's true. Perhaps I'm being a bit harsh. And perhaps I've missed something in my reading. But, it sure would be helpful and give a good bit more weight to what he's saying if he was actually citing some legitimate research.

    - Kaleb M.

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  9. Kane seems to attempt to use SFAs to explain away The Intelligibility Problem. He contends that, because SFAs are needed for ultimate responsibility, the occurrence of them in an indeterministic system explains the existence of ultimate responsibility. Of course, matters are more detailed than that, but this is a rough approximation of Kane's response.

    I'm not sure what I think. I sense that I need to have a better understanding of Kane's treatment of the problem, both generally and specifically. But here are a few thoughts.

    It seems to me that SFAs, if they exist in an indeterministic system, would help matters. But that's just the issue: Can they exist in an indeterministic system? I'm unsure, and I'm unsure what exactly brings about SFAs. (Put another way, I'm not sure what the 'will' is, on Kane's view.) Kane's reasons are, as I see it right now, less than convincing.

    Blake H.

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  10. I think I like Kane’s explanation of SFAs being the way we truly have ultimate responsibility and therefore free will, but he does not seem to support this position very well in this section of our reading. Rather, he offers us a few examples of what SFAs look like, and he builds into his description evidence which refutes the Intelligibility problem. By describing the businesswoman’s actions as “overcoming temptation” when she decides what action to make, he preempts an objection on the grounds that this decision was one over which she had no control, and by saying that she is making “an effort of will” he preempts an objection on the grounds that she did not make a rational choice. But behind this use of language, I really don’t know if he can possibly be stating something which can be proven.

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  11. I'm definitely with that majority opinion. I don't find Kane's explanation for free will all that satisfying.
    The major problem I found (which others have mentioned) was his explanation does end up being mysterious (as will said). I agree with Faith on this point, too (and I touch on it in my quiz)--I don't understand this idea of gaps or interruptions of time where free will exists. His argument relies on SFAs for UR, like in Compatibility, but I still hold what I believed before...I find it problematic that SFAs are ultimately influenced on what is going on around us and a lot of factors. It doesn't feel 'free' enough for me.

    Kaleb, you bring up a good point with research, especially cause I have heard a lot more studies that seem to show actions happen before the brain makes decisions (anyone heard the study where they measured the brain waves of tennis players and found that their bodies reacted before their brains did?)-Anyone have any scientific points they could bring up?

    'Batman': you also spelled 'embarrassing' wrong.

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  12. And you failed to capitalize the proper noun 'Will,' 'Kimberly.'

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